量子密钥分配系统波长攻击安全性分析

量子电子学报

量子密钥分配系统波长攻击安全性分析

马媛媛1，2，贾耕涛3，刘云4,黄秀丽1，2

1全球能源互联网研究院有限公司，江苏南京，210003； 2信息网络安全国网重点实验室，江苏南京，210003； 3国网上海市电力公司，上海，200122； 4安徽问天量子科技股份有限公司，安徽芜湖，241000

出版日期:2019-05-28 发布日期:2019-05-14
作者简介:马媛媛( 1978 － ) ，女，河南平顶山人。全球能源互联网研究院有限公司信息通信所，高级工程师。研究方向为电力系统通信，电力系统信息安全。 E-mail: mayuanyuan@geiri.sgcc.com.cn（通信联系人）
基金资助:
国家电网有限公司科技项目State Grid Corporation of China science and technology projects (SGRIXTKJ［2017］ 459 号)资助项目

Security of quantum key distribution with wavelength attack

MA Yuanyuan1，2, JIA Gentao3, LIU Yun4, HUANG Xiuli1，2

1 Global Energy Interconnection Research Institute Co. Ltd, Nanjing 210003, China; 2 State Grid Key Laboratory of Information &Network Security, Nanjing 210003, China; 3 Shanghai Electric Power Company, Shanghai 200122, China; 4 Anhui Qasky Quantum Science and Technology Company Ltd, Wuhu 241000, China

Published:2019-05-28 Online:2019-05-14

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 量子密钥分配协议的无条件安全性建立在理想的量子设备、经典设备和随机数的假设下，实际系统与理想协议存在一定的差异性，这种差异性可能被窃听者利用，从而导致系统的不安全。利用分束器的分束比具有波长相关特性，窃听者可以采取波长攻击控制接收端测量基矢的选择。基于基矢选择的随机性偏差参数，给出分束器波长相关性的定量刻画方法。进一步利用纠缠提纯安全性分析技术，分析了量子密钥分配系统在波长攻击下的安全性，给出了不同随机性偏差参数下的安全密钥率公式。

关键词: 量子密钥分配, 波长攻击, 安全密钥率

Abstract: The unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocols is based on the assumption of ideal quantum devices, classical devices and random numbers. However, there are some differences between the actual system and the ideal protocol, which may be controlled by the eavesdropper to attack the practical quantum key distribution system. The realistic beam splitter has a wavelength-dependent property, which can be applied by the eavesdropper to control the measurement basis selection. By proposing the randomness deviation parameters about the measurement basis selection, the wavelength-dependent property can be effectively estimated. More precisely, we analyze security of quantum key distribution with wavelength attack by utilizing the entanglement distillation and purification technology, and prove the security key rate with different randomness deviation parameters.

Key words: quantum key distribution, wavelength attack, secure key rate

马媛媛1，2，贾耕涛3，刘云4,黄秀丽1，2. 量子密钥分配系统波长攻击安全性分析[J]. 量子电子学报.

MA Yuanyuan1，2, JIA Gentao3, LIU Yun4, HUANG Xiuli1，2. Security of quantum key distribution with wavelength attack[J]. Chinese Journal of Quantum Electronics.

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