新型设备无关量子密钥分配协议研究

量子电子学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (1): 45-49.

新型设备无关量子密钥分配协议研究

叶萌1, 徐立坤1, 黄观金1, 李建辉1, 刘云2∗

1 南方电网调峰调频发电有限公司信息通信分公司, 广东广州510700; 2 安徽问天量子科技股份有限公司, 安徽芜湖241000

收稿日期:2020-03-17 修回日期:2020-06-08 出版日期:2021-01-28 发布日期:2021-02-01
通讯作者: E-mail: yunliu@mail.ustc.edu.cn E-mail:yunliu@mail.ustc.edu.cn
作者简介:叶萌( 1977 - ), 广东广州人, 高级工程师, 主要从事保密通信, 网络安全和无线通信等方面的研究。E-mail: yemeng@em.pgc.csg

Research on new device independent quantum key distribution protocol

YE Meng1, XU Likun1, HUANG Guanjin1, LI Jianhui1, LIU Yun2∗

1 CSG Power Generation Company Information Communication Branch, Guangzhou 510700, China; 2 Anhui Qasky Quantum Technology Co. Ltd., Wuhu 241000, China

Received:2020-03-17 Revised:2020-06-08 Published:2021-01-28 Online:2021-02-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 设备无关量子密钥分配协议是近年来量子信息领域的重要问题之一, 其安全性不依赖于理想的量子态制备和测量, 从而可以有效避免强光致盲攻击和波长攻击等, 因此具有更高的安全性。设备无关量子密钥分配协议的安全性基于贝尔不等式的违反, 当违反值大于经典值时才可以产生安全密钥。基于α−CHSH 不等式, 在比特翻转信道模型下研究了设备无关量子密钥分配协议安全性, 并给出了安全密钥率与α−CHSH 不等式违反值之间的关系。

关键词: 量子通信, 设备无关, 量子密钥分发, 安全, 协议, 不等式

Abstract: Device-independent quantum key distribution protocol is one of the most important research directions in the field of quantum information theory in recent years. The security of this kind of protocols is not based on the perfect state preparation and measurement, thus it can be applied to avoid the blinding attack from intense light and the wavelength attack, which leads to higher security. Device-independent quantum key distribution protocols are based on the Bell inequality, and the classical value violation can be used to guarantee the security. Based on α−CHSH inequality, the security of device-independent quantum key distribution protocols is investigated in the bit flipped channel model, and the relationship between the final secret key rate with the violation value of α−CHSH inequality is given.

Key words: quantum communication, device independent, quantum key distribution, security, protocol;
inequality

中图分类号:

TN915.04

叶萌, 徐立坤, 黄观金, 李建辉, 刘云∗. 新型设备无关量子密钥分配协议研究[J]. 量子电子学报, 2021, 38(1): 45-49.

YE Meng, XU Likun, HUANG Guanjin, LI Jianhui, LIU Yun∗. Research on new device independent quantum key distribution protocol[J]. Chinese Journal of Quantum Electronics, 2021, 38(1): 45-49.

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