Security of quantum key distribution with wavelength attack

Abstract

Abstract: The unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocols is based on the assumption of ideal quantum devices, classical devices and random numbers. However, there are some differences between the actual system and the ideal protocol, which may be controlled by the eavesdropper to attack the practical quantum key distribution system. The realistic beam splitter has a wavelength-dependent property, which can be applied by the eavesdropper to control the measurement basis selection. By proposing the randomness deviation parameters about the measurement basis selection, the wavelength-dependent property can be effectively estimated. More precisely, we analyze security of quantum key distribution with wavelength attack by utilizing the entanglement distillation and purification technology, and prove the security key rate with different randomness deviation parameters.

Key words: quantum key distribution, wavelength attack, secure key rate

MA Yuanyuan1，2, JIA Gentao3, LIU Yun4, HUANG Xiuli1，2. Security of quantum key distribution with wavelength attack[J]. Chinese Journal of Quantum Electronics.

References

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